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Democratic Institutions and Environmental Quality: Effects and 




This paper aims at analysing the effect of democratic institutions on environmental quality (carbon 
dioxide per capita, sulfure dioxide per capita) and at identifying potential channel transmissions. We use panel 
data from 1960 to 2008 in 122 developing and developed countries and modern econometric methods. The 
results are as follows: Firstly, we show that democratic institutions have opposite effects on environment quality: 
a positive direct effect on environment quality and a negative indirect effect through investments and income 
inequality.  Indeed,  democratic  institutions  attract  investments  that  hurt  environment  quality.  Moreover,  as 
democratic institutions reduce income inequality, they also damage environment. Secondly, we find that the 
direct negative effect of democratic institutions is higher for local pollutant (SO2) than for global pollutant 
(CO2).  Thirdly,  the  nature  of  democratic  institutions  (presidential,  parliamentary)  is  not  conducive  to 
environmental  quality.  Fourtly,  results  suggest  that  the  direct  positive  effect  of  democratic  institutions  on 
environment quality is higher in developed countries than in developing countries. Thus, the democratic process 
in the first group of countries has increased their awareness for the environment protection. 
 
Key words: Democratic institutions (043); Air pollution (Q53); Panel data (C23); Income 
inequality (D31); Investments (E22)  
 
1.  Introduction 
Many  environmental  problems  can  be  explained  by  institutional  failure  and  bad 
governance methods.  At international level it is difficult to elaborate efficient  and equity 
systems  for  environment  resources  management  like  oceans  and  climate  warming.  The 
Summit of Copenhagues (2009) put into in light real and enormous problems in international 
cooperation  between  countries  for  fighting  climate  warming.  Though  scientists  reports 
emphasize that countries should act rapidly for reduce greenhouse effect gases responsable of 
climate warming. They also mention the huge challenge that international community must 
face, and especially democratic countries, to improve the situation.  
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In  the  analysis  of  the  determinants  of  environmental  quality,  political  determinants 
received relatively less attention than economic factors. As shown in table (1a & 1b), the 
simple  correlation  between  an  index  of  democratic  institutions  and  environmental  quality 





Table 1a : Correlation matrix for explicatives variables and Carbon dioxide per capita 




Income Inequality  Investment  Income
/capita 
Population  Trade 
C02/ capita  1.0000             
Democratic 
Institutions 
0.2787  1.0000           
Income 
Inequality 
-0.2577         -0.3898  1.0000         
Investment   0.1153  0.0492       -0.2643         1.0000       
Income/ 
capita 
-0.0050            -0.0235  -0.0256  0.2497  1.0000     
Population  -0.1364  -0.5537  0.4609  -0.1123  -0.0255  1.0000   
Trade   0.1468  0.0406        -0.0338          0.2648       -0.0742     -0.0922     1.0000 
Source : Author 
Table 1b : Correlation matrix for explicatives variables and sulfur dioxide per capita 




Income Inequality  Investment  Income
/capita 
Population  Trade 
S02/ capita  1.0000             
Democratic 
Institutions 
0.0832  1.0000           
Income 
Inequality 
-0.1521         -0.3834  1.0000         
Investment   0.0787  0.0531       -0.2819         1.0000       
Income/ 
capita 
-0.0211            -0.0324  -0.0256  0.2593  1.0000     
Population  -0.0121  -0.5690  0.4855  -0.1230  -0.0344  1.0000   
Trade   0.1034  0.0282        -0.0295          0.2738       -0.0725     -0.0340     1.0000 
Source : Author 
Thus it comes as no surprise that literature on this topic finds mitigated results. Indeed, some 
authors  find  that  democratic  institutions  favour  environment  protection  whereas  others 
conclude  to  a  negative  effect.    On  nineteen  empirical  studies  (table  (2)),  six  uncovers  a 
negative  association  between  democracies  and  environment  quality,  nine  find  a  positive 
association and the remaining four are inconclusive.  However, a limit of these papers is that 
they  don‟t  explicitily  identify  channel  transmissions  of  democratic  institutions  on 
environment  quality.  Indeed,  findings  that  democracy  has  a  mitigated  partial  effect  on 
environment quality may hide the fact that it entails both costs and benefits. Identifying and 
specifying the channel transmissions from democratic institutions to environment protection  
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will  allow  a  better  understanding  of  environmental  costs  and  benefits  of  democratic 
institutions.  
This  paper  aims  at  analysing  the  effect  of  democratic  institutions  on  environment 
quality and at identifying channel transmissions. The main contribution of this paper is that 
we identify and test some channels by which democratic institutions affect the environment 
quality. We identify and test two transmission channels : income inequality and investments. 
We use panel data from 1960 to 2008 for 122 countries and modern econometric methods that 
are one-step GMM-System, two-step GMM-System one step, fixed effect estimators and the 
residuals generated regressors. The results are as follows: Firstly, we show that democratic 
institutions  have  opposite  effects  on  environment  quality;  a  positive  direct  effect  on 
environment quality and a negative indirect effect through investments and income inequality. 
Indeed, democratic institutions attract investments that hurt environment quality. Moreover, 
as democratic institutions reduce income inequality, they also damage environment. Secondly, 
we find that the direct negative effect of democratic institutions is higher for local pollutant 
(SO2)  than  for  global  pollutant  (CO2).  Thirdly,  the  nature  of  democratic  institutions 
(presidential,  parliamentary)  is  not  conducive  to  environmental  quality.  Fourtly,  results 
suggest that the direct positive effect of democratic institutions on environment quality is 
higher in developed countries than in developing countries. Thus, the democratic process in 
the first group of countries has increased their awareness for the environment protection. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section outlines the arguments on the 
relation between democratic institutions and environment quality and discusses on previous 
empirical  findings.  In  section  3,  we  identify  potential  channel  transmissions  between 
democratic institutions and environment quality.  Section 4 derives estimating equations and 
shows empirical results and the last is devoted to the conclusion. 
2. Effect of Democratic institutions on environment quality  
The  relation  between  democratic  institutions  and  environment  quality  has  been 
studied. Some authors conclude that democratic insitutions favour environment protection 
whereas others find negative effect.  
2.1. Theorical arguments 
2.1.1. Democracy improves environment quality  
According many authors, democracy is vertious and has a positive effect on environment 
quality.  Payne  (1995)  argues  that  population,  in  democratic  countries,  are  free  to  collect 
information about environment quality. They can express their preferences and put pressures 
on  their  governments.  With democacy,  citizens  are more aware of  environment problems 
(freedom of media). They can also express their preferences for environment (freedom of 
expression)  and  create  lobbying  groups  (freedom  of  association).  Political  leaders  are 
prompted (rights to vote) to implement environmental policies at national and international 
levels. McCloskey (1983) and Payne (1995) put on relief an important ability of democratic 
countries to satisfy people‟s environmental préférences and their will to commit themselves to 
international  negociations  and  agreements.  Economics  models  (Page  and  Shapiro  (1983)) 
about  the  link  between  public  and  political  decisions  suggest  that  when  people  are  well 
informed  about  major  problems,  the  latter  are  widely  influenced.  In  autocratic  regimes, 
populations cannot access information and create lobbying groups. 
Deacon  (1999)  and  Olson  (1993)  argue  that  political  freedoms  are  in  favour  of 
environmental protection because non democratic regimes will under produce environment 
considered as a public good. According to them, autocratics regims are led by political elites  
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who monopolize and hold large share of national incomes and revenues. The implementation 
of  rigorous  environmental  policies  can  lower  the  levels  of  production,  income  and 
consumption, which, in turn impose a higher cost on the elite in an autocracy than on the 
population whereas the marginal benefit is uniform for both elite and population. Elites in an 
autocracy are therefore relatively less pro-environment than people in democracy.  
According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), in democratic countries, the majority of 
citizens have right to vote, to their preferences and the government is supposed to represent 
that in economic policies. As the preferences of median voter are important in democratic 
elections and it marginal cost of the implementation of environmental policies is lower than 
autocratic leaders, the adoption and implementation of environmental policies will prevail in 
democratic countries. The leaders in the preservation of biodiversity or fighting of climate 
change would be models for other countries. 
Congleton (1992) analyses the effect of political regimes (democratic or autocratic) on 
environmental  policies.  He  supposes  that  temporal  short  horizon  contributes  to  a  weak 
regulation of environmental policies. As the consequences of environment degradation appear 
on  the  long  term,  political  leaders  can  have  myopia  behaviour  and  under  produce 
environment. Indeed, the short duration of electoral cycles incites political leaders to adopt 
economical politics favourable to their re-elections. It is difficult to implement policies and to 
impose to population, who are also voters, a change of behaviour on problems which the 
consequences will be at the future.  
2.1.2. Democray hurts environment quality 
  Many  authors  think  that  democracy  does  not  favour  environment  protection.  The 
implementation of democratic institutions comes with individual freedoms. Desai (1989b) 
thinks  that  democracy  doesn‟t  protect  environment  because  democracy  is  a  factor  of 
economic growth and prosperity, which hurt the quality of environment. Democracy is also 
correlated with factors such as property rights and social infrastructures that boost economic 
growth.  
Firstly, Hardin (1968) worries about the management and overexploitation of environmental 
and  natural  resources.  The  property  rights  of  environmental  and  natural  resources  (for 
example air, oceans,  forests)  are not  well defined.  This  overexploitation is  accelerated in 
democracies in which individuals have business and economic freedom. 
Secondly, Paehlke (1996) thinks that the nature of environment and democracy are different. 
Environment is a global phenomena whereas democacy works on national and local levels. 
Consequently, environmental problems could not be resolved in an adequate and opportune 
way. For example, Heilbronner (1974) supports the idea that global growth of population 
threatens  environmental  quality.  Autocratic  countries  can  restrain  demographic  dynamic 
while democratic countriest must respect people freedoms. 
Moreover,  Dryzek  (1987)  notices  that  democracies  are  also  economic  markets  wherein 
lobbying  groups  are  very  important.  According  to  him,  there  are  many  countries  where 
political leaders are influenced by lobbying groups and multilateral companies. Democracies 
are  not  considered  as  protecting  environment  quality  as  they  are  supposed  to  satisfy  the 
preferences of markets and lobbying groups which aims at maximizing their economic profit 
that is not in favour of a better environment quality.    
5 
Finally, we think that when democracy is established, institutions becomes more complex and 
rigid.  So,  Olson  (1982)  and  Midlarksy  (1998)  claim  that  lobbying  groups  are  partially 
responsible for the rigidity of institutions in mature democracies. In other words, in mature 
and  democratic  countries,  the  supply  of  public  goods  could  be  reduced  by  an  important 
number of lobbying groups which are less or not incited to take care of society interests. They 
can try to influence or to control legislatif and administratif process. Consequently, public 
policies could be less favourable to environment quality when they are influenced by lobbying 
groups. 
Theorical arguments show that it‟s difficult to predict the impact of democratic institutions on 
environmental quality. Let us now turn to the empirical findings.   
2.2. Empirical results 
Congleton  (1992)  is  one  of  the  earliest  scholars  who  explored  the  effect  of  political 
institutions  on  the  willingness  of  governments  to  control  environment  quality.  He  uses 
ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  regressions  and  finds  that  democratic  countries have  higher 
methane and Chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) emissions than autocratic countries. He also finds 
that they are more likely to sign the Vienna Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.  
Contrary to him, Barret & Graddy (2000) use panel data (with generalized least squared and 
random effect) and conclude that political and civic freedoms reduce some pollutants (Sulfur 
dioxide) but have no effect on other pollutants (water pollution).  Torras &Boyce (1998), 
using the same data and OLS, also find that political and civic freedoms have a positive effect 
on air and water quality in least developing countries.  Scruggs
2 (1998) finds that democracy 
has  no  effect  on  environment  quality  (dissolved  oxygen,  fecal  coliform  and  particules 
emissions) but increases sulphur dioxide emissions.  
Gleditsch & Sverdrup (2003) run simple bivariate correlations with Polity data and find that 
democracy is harmful for climate gases. Midlarsky (1998) runs multivariate OLS regressions 
and concludes that democracy increases carbon dioxide emissions and deforestation but 
protect land area.  
Li & Reuveny (2006), using a large sample (between  105 and 143 countries), show that 
democracy  (continuous  and  dichotomous  variables )  reduces  environmental  degradation 
(carbon dioxide emissions, nitrogen oxide, land degradation, deforesta tion, organic pollution 
in water). They also indicate that the effect  of democracy varies in size accross the five 
environmental indicators.  
Finally, Bernauer & Koubi (2009) test the effects of political institutions on air quality  in 42 
countries over the period 1971-1996 and find interesting results.  Firstly, democracy has an 
independant  positive  effect  on  air  quality.  Secondly,  presidential  systems  favour 
environmental protection than parliamentary systems.  Thirdly, they show that labor union 
strength reduces the environment protection whereas the green parties improve it. 
A important limitation with these previous studies is that they are interested in the 
effects of political institutions on environmental quality.   None of them explicitly identify 
channel transmissions through the political institutions affect the environmental quality.  
3. Democratic Institutions and environment quality: potential channel transmissions 
                                                            
2 He always uses Freedom House data.    
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In this section, we identify the potential transmission channels between democratic 
institutions and environment quality.  
3.1. Democratic institutions and income inequality  
  An important caracteristic of democracy is the right to vote. Indeed, an exclusion of an 
important part of population leads to a biais in political leaders‟s preferences. Many authors 
assert that an improvement of democratic institutions increases the possiblities of people to 
ask  for  a  better  distribution  of  income  (Boix,  1998).  As  they  are  democratically  elected, 
democratic leaders are incited to adopt redistribution policies such as minimum wage, prices 
subsidy and progressive taxation for the poor and middle classes. In other words, democratic 
process is supposed to reduce income inequality. On the contrary, autocratic leaders will tend 
to adopt policies that are in favour of the elite in powers and maintain consequently, they 
maintain income inequality.  
  Scully (1992) shows that countries where property rights and political openness exist, 
are  less  inequaliterian  than  countries  where  they  aren‟t  implemented.  Using  a  transversal 
analysis for 126 countries over 1960-1998, Gradstein et al. (2001) show that the effect of 
democracy on income inequality depends on ideology that is the dominant religion in the 
country.  So  in  Judeo-Christian  societies,  democracy  is  a  factor  of  reduction  of  income 
inequality while it has no effect in Muslims and Confucian societies. In these countries, equity 
is a social value really important and income transferts are made in an informal way (family 
for example). Muller and Stratmann (2002) show that a high rate participation of citizens in 
the elections, affects the government policies, what tends to reduce income inequality. This 
income  inequality  reduction  is  made  through  income  transfers  or  the  size  of  government 
(spendings).  Reuveny and Li (2003) also conclude that democracies have a positive effect on 
income distribution.  
3.2. Democratic institutions and investments  
In the analysis on the relation between democratic institutions and investments, there are two 
opposing trends. One concludes that democratic institutions reduce investments and the other 
one, they increase them.  
According  to  Huntington  and  Dominguez  (1975),  in  democracy,  people  have  to  choose 
between consumption and saving, but tend to be in favour of the latter. Indeed, democracy 
allows the median voter to redistribute the revenues in favour of the poor what reduces saving 
and investment. Some authors such as Alesina and Rodrik (1994) think that democracy can 
allow  expropriation  of  physical  capital  by  the  median  voter  if  his  income  is  lower  than 
average income or if he has greater political rights.  
However  this  point  of  view  is  questionned  by  other  authors  who  think  that  political 
institutions favour investments. Firstly, the establishment of a political democratic system 
requires a broad social consensus allowing the political process to be more stable and more 
efficient than autocratic regimes. Economic agents would also be more incited to invest in 
democratic countries than in autocratic countries wherein social consensus is low. Helliwel 
(1994), Pastor and Hilt (1993), Pastor and Sung (1995) conclude that democratic institutions 
have positive effect on private investments.  
Moreover,  democratic  regimes  are  also  politically  stable  so  they  attract  investments.  In 
political instability, economic agents consume more and reduce saving. Moreover, political 
instability  is  also  a  factor  of  uncertainty  because  it  increases  risks  and/or  perception  of  
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investment risks. Its reduces rights and safety of investors. Yi (2001) shows that political 
freedoms increase investments while uncertainty and political instability reduce them.  
4. Empirical Analysis  
4.1. Estimation method and empirical procedure 
4.1.1. Empirical Procedure 
The  objective  of  the  paper  is  to  analyse  the  effect  of  democratic  institutions  on 
environment quality and also to identify potential channel transmissions. We think that one 
hand,  democratic  institutions  have  direct  effect  on  environment  quality  and  other  part, 
indirectly through income inequality and investments.  
Our empirical procedure follows three steps. In first step, we estimate our environmental 
variables carbon dioxide per capita emissions on democratic institutions and control variables 
without channel transmissions. Control variables are from environment economic literature 
and are determinants of carbon dioxide per capita emissions. There are income per capita, 
carbon dioxide per capita at the beginning of period, population growth and trade openness.  
                                                                                       (1) 
With       : the average quantity of carbon dioxide per capita (CO2)  and sulfur dioxide per 
capita (SO2) (in ton metric)  in a country (i) at a year t ;       are control variables without 
transmission channels;              is our interest variable. The period is 1960 to 2008 and 
data are compiled in five-year averages. Our sample is made of 122 developed and developing 
countries. 
In a second step, we include in the equation (1) the channel transmissions variables allowing 
democratic institutions to affect indirectly environment quality (SO2, CO2). There are income 
inequality and investments.   
                                        
                                                            (2) 
In a last step, we empirically test the effect of democratic institutions on each transmission 
channel.  
      
                                                                                        (3)  
With     a vector of channel transmissions: income inequality and investments.   
4.1.2. Estimation strategy   
In order to estimate this model we use adequate econometric techniques. The panel 
data  take  into  account  transversal,  temporal  dimensions  observed  and  unobserved 
heterogeneity  of  countries.    It  is  inadequate  to  estimate  equations  (1)  and  (2)  using 
respectively OLS (Ordinary Least Square), Fixed Effects (FE) and/or Random Effect (RE) 
because the former (OLS) doesn‟t take into account unobserved heterogeneity of countries 
and the latter (FE, RE) is inadequate for dynamic models. Indeed, the dependent variable is 
lagged and endogenous.  We use the GMM-System (Generalized Method of Moment) from 
Arellano-Bond (1991), Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell-Bond (1998).   
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The GMM-System (Generalized Method of Moment) is a method that estimates a 
system of two equations: one equation in level and the other in first difference.  In the first 
estimate, we use lagged variables in level of at least one period as instruments of the equation 
in  first  difference.  It  removes  unobserved  time  invariant  and  unobserved  individual 
characteristics.  The  conditions  to  be  met  are  the  error  terms  are  uncorrelated  and  that 
explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. In the second estimate, we use variables in first 
difference lagged of at least one period as instruments of the equation in level.  
To  check  the  validity  of  results  we  use  the  standard  Hansen  test  of  over-identifying 
restrictions (where the null hypothesis is that the instrumental variables are not correlated with 
the residual)  and the serial correlation test (AR(2), where the null hypothesis is that the errors 
exhibit no second-order serial correlation).  
4.2. Determinants of environmental quality  
4.2.1. Environmental quality  
In the absence of a single measure of environmental quality, many indicators have been used 
in the literature as proxy for environmental quality. For the purpose of our study, we use two 
pollutants variables. These are carbon dioxide (   ) per capita and sulfurdioxide (   ) per 
capita. The choice of CO2 as an environmental indicator is based on two reasons. Firstly, data 
on carbon dioxide emissions are available for longer time-series than any other pollution 
indicator.  Secondly,  at  the  global  level,  CO2  is  an  immediate  cause  of  greenhouse  gas, 
responsible  for  global  warming  and  climate  change.  Moreover,  carbon  dioxide  emissions 
contribute to global warming more than any other greenhouse gas. At the domestic level, 
while CO2 by itself does not pose any immediate health hazard to human beings, it is usually 
a by-product of increased industrial activity, which, in the absence of stringent regulation, can 
be a source of toxic emissions and particulates that pose environmental concerns.  
The choice of SO2 as another environmental variable is also based on two arguments. Firstly, 
contrary to carbon dioxide emissions, sulfure dioxide is a local pollutant. It is widely regarded 
as one of the most prominent form of air pollution worldwide, since it has direct and visible 
effects on human health, ecosystems, and the economy ((Konisky, 1999). SO2 has negative 
effects  on  the  human  body.  It  causes  acid  rain,  which  damages  forests,  lakes,  buildings, 
cultural objects, and agricultural production. It also reduces visibility, from light mist to dense 
gray smog. Moreover, particles (smoke and soot), sulfur dioxide (SO2), ozone (O3), lead, 
Nitrogen oxides (NO, and NO2, together NOx), and carbon monoxide (CO) constitute the so-
called criteria pollutants. These indicators are used to measure and describe the air quality in a 
country. Secondly, data for SO2 emissions is more reliable than data for other forms of air 
pollution (so-called criteria pollutants), and it is also available for a rather large number of 
countries  since  the  1970s.  Data  with  similar  properties  is  not  available  for  most  other 
environmental quality indicators, such as NOx, VOC, CO, PM, ozone.  
4.2.2. Control variables 
We  refer  to  the  literature  on  environmental  economics  and  identify  determinants  of 
environmental quality. There are income per capita, trade openness, population growth and air 
pollution emissions at the beginning of period.  
Carbon dioxide  and Sulfur dioxide emissions per capita at the beginning of period.  
In our opinion, we think that the environment quality (for  example carbon dioxide per capita) 
at the begining of period can be an important determinant of current level of carbon dioxid per  
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capita.  It  takes  into  account  the  inertia  degree  of  air  pollution  and  time  neccessary  to 
implement environment policies or to reduce air pollution.  
Income per capita 
The relation between income per capita and environment quality has been widely studied in 
literature. Income can affect environment quality through the scale of economic activity,  the 
composition (or structure) of economic activity, and  the effect of income on the demand and 
supply of pollution abatement effort.  
The larger the scale of economic activity, all else equal, the higher the level of environmental 
degradation (pollution, resource depletion) is likely to be, since increased economic activity 
results in increased levels of resource use and waste generation, if nothing else changes. Since 
income is acting as an indicator of economic activity, we would expect a positive relationship 
between environmental degradation and income, while controlling for all other income-related 
effects. 
The  composition  of  economic  activity  affects  environmental  quality  because  of  the 
differential pollution (and resource-using) intensity of different sectors of the economy. The 
primary  sector  (agriculture,  fisheries,  forestry,  and  mining)  tends  to  be  more  resource 
intensive  than  either  the  secondary  (industry)  or  tertiary  (services)  sectors.  The  industry 
(especially manufacturing), on the other hand, tends to be more pollution-intensive than either 
agriculture or services. Since the structure of the economy (sectoral composition of output) 
changes  with  economic  growth,  part  of  the  effect  of  increases  in  income  per  capita  on 
environmental degradation reflects the effects of changing composition of output.  Since the 
share of industry in GDP first rises with economic growth and then declines as the country 
moves from the pre-industrial to the post-industrial stage of development, we can suppose an 
inverted-U  shaped  relationship  between  environmental  pollution  and  income  level  while 
controlling for all other influences transmitted through income. In other words, in the earlier 
phases of development there is a shift away from agriculture toward heavy industry which 
increases emissions, while in the later stages of development there is a shift from the more 
resource  intensive  extractive  and  heavy  industrial  sectors  toward  services  and  lighter 
manufacturing,  which  supposedly  have  lower  emissions  per  unit  of  output.  This  is 
environmental Kuznets curve (EKC). This hypothese has been validated for some pollutants 
such as sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides (Grossman and Krueger (1995), 
Selden and Song (1994), Shafik (1994), Suri and Chapman (1998) and Bimonte (2002).  For 
other pollutants such as carbon dioxide, results are mixed or contradictory.  Indeed, Holtz-
Eakin  and Selden (1995)  don‟t validate the EKC while  Schmalensee et al. (1998) do it. 
While the generation of pollution is driven by scale and composition of economic activity, the 
abatement of pollution is driven by demand and supply factors both of which are influenced 
by income. On the demand side, at low-income levels, people are more concerned with food 
and other material needs and less concerned with environmental quality. At higher income 
levels, people want higher levels of environmental quality. Selden and Song (1995) think that  
the  relationship  between  income  and  demand  for  environmental quality translates  into an 
inverted-J curve between income and environmental degradation. In contrast to the inverted 
U-curve  relationship  of  the  reduced-form  model,  the  inverted  J-curve  indicates  a  non-
increasing relationship between environmental degradation and income once the scale and 
composition of output are  controlled for. This is  a reflection of the non-negative  income 
elasticity of environmental quality which is visible in the J-curve but masked by scale and 
structural factors in the U-curve. On the supply side, low incomes cannot afford countries and 
individuals  much  expenditure  on  pollution  abatement  even  if  the  demand  were  there. 
Economic growth not only creates the demand for improved environmental quality, but it also  
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makes the resources available to supply it. Higher incomes enable higher public expenditures 
on environmental infrastructure as well as environmental regulations that drive private sector 
expenditure on abatement technologies. 
Trade openness 
Grossman and Krueger (1995) decompose the effects of trade on environment into scale, 
technical  and  composition  effects.  The  scale  effect  of  trade  measures  the  negative 
environmental consequences of scalar increases in economic activity. The technical effect is 
the  positive  environmental  consequences  of  increases  in  income  that  call  for  cleaner 
production methods. The composition effect can have a positive or negative impact on the 
environment  because  it  measures  the  evolution  the  economy  towards  a  more  or  less 
appropriate productive structure. Thus, Antweiler and Al (2001) conclude that trade reduced 
emissions of pollution of 43 countries over the period 1971-1996. Frankel and Rose (2005) 
also conclude that trade is favourable to the reduction of pollution. However, other authors 
such as Managi (2004) conclude that trade has a negative impact on carbon dioxide emissions. 
Population growth 
Many authors analyse the effect of growth and the level of population on environment quality. 
According to National Academy of science (NAS, 1992), “The more people there are in the 
world, the greater is the demand put on resources to provide food, energy, clothing and shelter 
for them. All these activities necessarily involve emissions of greenhouse gases”. Newell & 
Marcus  show  there  is  a  „„nearly  perfect‟‟  correlation  (99,8%)  between  world  population 
growth and growing concentration of carbon dioxide over the period 1958-1983. Holdren 
(1991) and Harisson (1994) use mathematical formula to find a contribution of population 
growth to greenhouse gas emissions. They conclude that population growth is responsible for 
40% (36%) of the increase in energy consumption (annual emissions growth) respectively. 
However  Lutz  (1993) found  that  population  growth  has  a  small  role  in  industrial  carbon 
dioxide  emissions.  They  also  show  that  population  growth  rate  has  a  positive  effect  on 
pollution. 
4.2.3. Transmission channels variables 
Investments 
According to Brock&Taylor (2004), a high investment rate leads to high physical capital 
stock at regular state and increases carbon dioxide per capita emissions during transitional 
dynamic. Investments are the motor of economic growth. Foreign and domestic investments 
allow countries to access international markets, trade, new technologies and competences. 
However these opportunities can differ with countries development.  
In  some  countries, investments  are directed towards  building,  services  and manufacturing 
sectors. In other countries, they are directed towards natural resource sectors in particular, oil 
firms, wood companies, big consumers of energy and thus pollutants. For example in Africa, 
65% of direct foreign investments go to the natural resources sector. The expected effects are 
a rise of employment, a rise of taxes, a rise of revenues for the states and the reduction of 
poverty.  These countries can also be less sensitive to environmental problems. In the same 
way, the weakness of infrastructures, particularly roads, strongly increases the use of energy 
and consumption of polluting resources. 
Income inequality  
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Many scholars such as Boyce (1994), Marsiliani& Renström (2000), Borghesi (2000) have 
analysed the effect of income inequality on environment quality. Some authors conclude that 
income inequality favours environment protection whereas others find negative effect. 
Firstly  Boyce  (1994)  develops  theorical  arguments  that  income  inequaliy  increases 
environment degradation through the rate of time preference and the benefit-cost analysis of 
environmentally degrading activities. As to the first point, Boyce (1994) thinks that income 
inequality reduces awarness of environment quality for both rich and poor. The poor would 
overexploit natural and environmental resources because of survival motivation. Similarly, 
rich people will not also protect the environment quality. Income inequality increases and 
exacerbates  conflicts  in  income  distribution  and  political  instability.  The  polarization  of 
resources and incomes causes violence and social trouble. This leads rich people to prefer a 
policy  of  overexploiting  the  environment  and  natural  resources  and  investing  the  returns 
abroad.  
Secondly, political power is highly correlated to income inequality. Rich people are likely to 
have  political  power  and  to  influence  environmental  policies.  The  implementations  of 
environmental policies are based on cost-benefit analysis, the competition between people 
who benefit from the environment destruction and those who bear the cost of it. Therefore 
Boyce (1994) concludes that income inequality affects the distribution of power and allows 
people  who  benefit  from  activities  that  degrade  the  environment  (the  rich)  to  impose 
environmental cost on the losers.  
Thirdly, Borghesi (2000) argues that the implementation of environmental policies is likely 
with social consensus. It is easier to get this consensus  in an equal society  that in an unequal 
society with conflicts among political agents and social instability.  
Several empirical studies have found that income inequality degrades environmental quality. 
Magnani (2000) finds that reductions in pollution are more likely if a country's economic 
growth is accompanied by improvements in income equality. In a study of tropical countries, 
Koop  and  Tole  (2001)  conclude  that  inequalities  of  income  and  landownership  tend  to 
exacerbate  deforestation.  Mikkelson  et  al.  (2007)  and  Holland  et  al.  (2009)  find  income 
inequality to be a statistically significant predictor of biodiversity loss.  
However  other  scholars  think  that  income  inequality  may  have  no  effect  or  improve 
environment quality.  
Firstly Ravallion et al.(2000) claim that the impact of income distribution on environmental 
degradation depends on the marginal propensity to emit (MPE). According to them, each 
agent  has  an  implicit  demand  function  for  air  pollution  (carbon  dioxide)  since  the 
consumption of every good pollute the environment quality either directly (via consumption) 
or indirectly (via its production).  If the poor have a higher (lower) MPE than the rich a 
reduction of income inequality will increase (reduce) pollution emissions respectively. One 
can‟t say a priori which of these two effects will happen. On the one hand, the poor may 
consume goods with more pollution than the rich. On the other hand they can use energy more 
efficiently than the rich. Therefore the effect of income inequality is not clear and depends on 
whether the marginal propensity to emit increases or decreases as income grows. In other 
words it depends on the second derivative of the pollution-income function.  
Secondly, Boyce (2003) shows that income distribution affects the demand for environmental 
quality. At any given level of average income, an increase in income inequality means the rich 
become more rich and the poor more poor. He supposes that the environment is a normal 
good and the income elasticity of demand for environmental quality is positive. An increase in 
income inequality increases the demand for environmental quality of the rich and decreases 
the demand of the poor.  The net effect on demand for environmental quality is ambigious and 
is function of the shape of the demand-income relation. If the relation is linear or demand for 
environmental  quality  increases  with  income  at  a  constant  rate,  an  increase  in  income  
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inequality will have no effect on the demand for environmental quality. If the demand-income 
relation is convex (concave) income inequality reduces (improves) environmental quality.  
  
4. 3. Overview of the Data  
The time period under study is 1960-2008 for 122 developed and developing countries. Our 
panel data are time period corresponding to five-year averages (1960-1964, 1965-1969,…). 
The data on carbon dioxide per capita, investments, trade openness, population growth and 
income  per  capita  are  from  World  Development  Indicators  (2008).  Those  on  democratic 
institutions, income inequality and sulfure dioxide per capita come respectively from Polity 
IV (2008), Texas Inequality Project (UTIP 2008) database and David Stern (2004).  
The  carbon  dioxide  per  capita  emissions  are  measured  in  metric  ton  per  capita  and  are 
estimated from the combustion of fossil energies, cement industries in the liquid, solid or gas 
form. Trade openness and investment correspond respectively to the share  of the sum of 
(exports and imports) and investments in gross domestic product (GDP).  
As democratic institutions, we chose the index of polity(2), which is a score obtained by 
differencing of the index of democracy and index of autocracy on a scale going from +10 
(democracy) to -10 (autocracy). The indicator of democracy is characterized by the effective 
existence of institutional rules framing of the power and the presence of institutions enabling 
citizens  to  express  their  expectations  and  choose  political  elites.  The  autocracy  is 
characterized by the absence or the restriction of political competition, economic planning and 
control. The exercise of the power is slightly constrained by institutions and the leaders are 
only selected within a “political elite”. 
Income inequality is a GINI coefficient. It comes from Texas Inequality Project (UTIP 2008) 
database. We use EHII (Estimated Household Income Inequality) variable that is an index 
ranging from 0 (no inequality) to 1 (perfect inequality) and is based on database of Deninger 
and Squire (D&S) and UTIP-UNIDO.  
The first column of tables (1a &1b) correlates environment variables (carbon dioxide per 
capita  and  sulfure  dioxide  per  capita)  with  the  explicative  variables  such  as  democratic 
institutions, income inequality, investments, income per capita, population growth and trade. 
The signs of these correlations are consistent with our priors. For example carbon dioxide per 
capita  emissions  are  positively  correlated  with  investments,  democratic  institutions  and 
negatively with income inequality, income per capita and population.  The second column 
(table1a)  contains  the  correlations  between  democratic  institutions  and  variables  such  as 
channel  transmissions  (income  inequality  and  investments).  Analysing  the  democratic 
institutions- channel and channel –carbon dioxide per capita correlations together (column 1 
& 2, table 1a), we have an outline of the direction of channel effects. Indeed democratic 
institutions  are  positively  correlated  with  investments  and  investments  are  positively 
correlated with carbon dioxide per capita implying that democratic institutions is positively 
correlated with carbon dioxid per capita positively through investment. The same analysis can 
be made with income inequality. We find similar conclusions for sulfur dioxide per capita 
emissions in table 1b. However to confirm or reject correlation results, it is better to estimate 
our equations and control for other determinants of environment quality.  
4.4. Résults 
Column (1) of table (4a &4b) shows results of equation (1) estimated by GMM-System. An 
improvement of democratic institutions contributes to a reduction of carbon dioxide emissions 
per capita and sulfur dioxide emissions per capita. The effect is -0,015 (-0,027) and significant 
at 5% (1%) respectively for     and     . These results are similar to Gleditsch & Sverdrup 
(2003), Li & Reveuny (2006) and Bernauer
 & Koubi (2009) who conclude that democratic 
institutions improve environment quality.    
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The next  coulumns  of  Table  (4a &4b) show results  of equation (2) estimated  by  GMM-
System. We estimate the effect of democratic institutions on environment quality emissions 










Table4a : Effect of democratic institutions on environment quality 
Log of carbon dioxide emissions per 
capita (One step GMM-System) 
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Observations  887  823 
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0.18  0.44  0.11  0.29 
Number of instruments   12  15  19  17 










Table4b: Effect of democratic institutions on environment quality 
Log of sulfure dioxide emissions per 
capita (One step GMM-System) 
    (1)    (2)      (3)       (4) 
Log of initial sulfur dioxide per 
capita 
0.865  0.991  0.852  0.879 
  (6.86)***  (7.06)***  (32.00)***  (11.33)*** 
 









  (3.20)***  (2.59)**  (2.00)**  (2.07)** 
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  (1.21)  (0.31)  (0.61)  (1.40) 
 









  (6.86)***  (0.74)  (1.28)  (0.71) 
 
Log of  investment 
   
0.183 
   
0.187 
    (2.97)***    (1.87)* 
 
Income Inequality  


























Number of countries   115  115  104  101 
AR (1)  0,02  0,01  0,03  0,05  
15 
AR(2)  0 ,24  0,15  0,21  0,24 
Hansen Test  0,12  0,24  0,11  0,13 
Number of instruments   20  19  11  26 
NB: * significatif at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The study period is 1960-2008. Temporal dummies 
In  column  (2)  of  table  (4a&4b),  we  include  invesments  in  regression.  We  find  that 
investments have a positive and significant effect on carbon dioxide emissions per capita and 
sulfur dioxide emissions per capita. Indeed, an increase in investments of 1% contributes to 
carbon dioxide emissions per capita by 0,80% and sulfur dioxide emissions per capita by 
0,18% respectively. Investments can be considered as an important factor of air pollution.  
In column (3) of table (4a&4b), we include only income unequality in regression.  We think 
that there would be an endogeneity between environmental quality and income inequality. 
According to Arrow et al. (1995), economic activity depends on the environmental resource 
base. High and imprudent use of the environmental resource base may reduce the capacity for 
generating material production and income in the future. The environmental resource base 
includes assimilative capacities for waste discharges.Secondly, the poorest are vulnerable to 
environmental  degradation  since  they  depend  heavily  on  natural  resources  and  have  less 
alternative resource. They are also exposed to environment hazards and are less capable of 
coping to environmental risks (Dagusta and Mäler, 1994; World Bank, DFID, EC, UNDP, 
2002).  Furthermore,  the  rich  are  more  capable  of  looking  after  themselves  from 
environmental diseases than the poorest. An increase in environment degradation would affect 
more the incomes of the poor than the rich and increase the income inequality.To solve the 
problem of endogeneity, we use GMM-System allowing us to instrument income inequality 
with  lagged  variables.  Result  indicates  that  an  increase  of  income  inequality  reduces  air 
pollution  emissions  (carbon  dioxide  per  capita  and  sulfur  dioxide  per  capita).  Income 
inequality  favours  environment  protection.    These  results  are  also  similar  to  scholars 
(Ravallion et al.(2000))  who claim that income inequality may have improve environment 
quality.  
The inclusion of investments and income inequality in regression (column (4) of table 
(4a  &  4b)  improve  the  magnitude  and  the  significance  of  the  coefficients  of  democratic 
institutions on environment quality. The final regression indicates the effect of democratic 
institutions, transmission channels (investments and income inequality) and control variables 
on  air  pollution.  The  coefficient  on  democratic  institutions  indicates  the  direct  effect  on 
environment  quality.  Moreover,  an  increase  of  magnitude  and  coefficient  of  democratic 
institutions (column (1) to column (4)) would indicate that they may have a partial effect 
through investments and incomeinequality. It would also be very important and interesting to 
test the existence of these two potential channel transmissions. 
4.4.1. Effect of democratic institutions on channel transmissions 
Our results seem to indicate that democratic institutions may have both direct and indirect 
effects through income inequality and investments on environment quality. In this section, we 
test the existence of these two channel transmissions. In equation (3.a & 3.b) respectively, we 
estimate democratic institutions on income inequality and investments.  
                                                                      (3.a) 
                                                                      (3.b) 













Table 5: Democratic Institutions and channel transmissions  
       Log of   
investment   
       Income Inequality 
     (1) FE     (2)  FE  (3) 
GMM System  
 
Log of Democratic Institutions   
   
0.037 




    (1.90)*    (1.26)*  (-2,31)** 
 
Log of income per capita 
   
0.075 




    (1.81)*    (3.51)***  (2.19)** 
 
 Population growth 
   
0.059 




    (3.24)***    (0.23)  (4.18)*** 
 
Log of Trade openness 
   
0.290 




    (7.09)***    (0.85)  (1.73)* 
 
Constant 
   
1.014 






  (2.50)**    (10.22)***  (2.12)** 
 
R-squared 
   
0.15 





   
662 





Number of countries 
   
122 










         
0,23 










NB: * significatif at10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The study period is 1960-2008. Dummy variables  
are included. 
Column (1) of table (5) shows result of equation (3.a) estimated with fixed effects  (FE) 
method. Democratic institutions have a positive effect on investments. Our results are similar 
with  Yi  (2001)  who  conclude  that  political  freedoms  (democratic  freedoms)  attract 
investments.  
Similarly,  column  (2)  shows  results  of  equation  (3.b)  estimated  with  fixed  effects    (FE). 
Result  shows  that  democratic  institutions  have  a  positive  effect  on  income  inequality. 
However we suspect an inverse relation (endogeneity problem) between income inequality 
and democratic institutions. Firstly, income inequality increases and exacerbates conflicts in 
income distribution and politicalinstability. The polarization of resources and incomes causes 
violence and social trouble. This situation can allow illegal activities, protest movements and 
coup d‟Etat (Figueroa, 1996).  Secondly, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) show that income 
inequality reduce strongly the consolidation of democracies. One argument is that it facilitates 
and allows a redistribution of incomes in favour of the poors and defavour of richs in power. 
The burden of democracy on the elites is increasing in the income gap between them and 
citizens.  They  would  have  an  incitative  to  destabilize  democracy.  Latin  America  is  an 
example  wherein  income  inequalities  do  not  allow  democracy  to  consolidate.  Estimation 
results are biaised. To solve the problem of endogeneity, we use GMM-System allowing us to 
instrumente democratic institutions with lagged variables.  
Column (3) concludes that democratic institutions reduce income inequality. Thus democracy 
allows the poor to get more resources through income redistribution.Result is similar with 
authors such as Boix (1998), Muller and Stratmann (2002).  Muller and Stratmann (2002) 
show that a better participation of citizens in elections (from 40% to 80%) reduces income 
inequality (Gini Index) in 10%. The reduction of income inequality is explained by income 
transfers or by government size (expenditure).  
Results indicate that democratic institutions have a positive (negative) effect on investments 
and income inequality respectively. Democratic institutions also affect environment quality 
indirectly through investments and income inequality.   
Indeed,  democratic  institutions  attract  investments  that  hurt  environment  quality 
(carbon  dioxide  emissions  per  capita  and  sulfur  dioxide  emissions  per  capita).  We  can 
conclude that democratic institutions increase air pollution through investments. Similarly, 
democratic institutions hurt environment quality because they reduce income inequality. Then 
democratic institutions have opposite effect on environment quality: a positive direct effect on 
environment quality and negative indirect effects through investments and income inequality. 
In other words, on one hand democratic institutions improve environment quality and other 
part, they hurt it through income inequality and investments. 
 
4.4.2. The importance of economic development 
An  important  characteristic  of  democratic  institutions  is  that  their  levels  are  different 
according to economic development. Table (6) shows that the level of democratic institutions 
is higher in developed countries (6.95) than in developing countries (-1.37).    
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Table 6: Difference of democratic institutions according to economic development   
Democratic Institutions  Mean  mini  max  S D 
Whole sample 
 
0.32  -10  10  7.33 











    Source: Polity IV and author 
 
Our  results  conclude  that  democratic  institutions  have  a  positive  direct  on  environmental 
quality. These results may be biaised and explained by the quality of democratic institutions 
in developed countries?  To answer this question, we distinguish two groups of countries that 
are  developing  countries  and  developed  countries  and  analyse  the  effect  of  democratic 
insitutions on environment quality. The results shown in columns (1) and (2) of table (7) 
indicate  that  democratic  institutions  in  both  groups  have  a  direct  positive  effect  on 
environment  quality.  More  interesting,  the  direct  effect  of  democratic  institutions  on 
environment quality in developed countries is higher than in developing countries. This can 
be explained by the fact that the quality of democratic institutions is better in developed 
countries than in developing countries.  
Another result is that the direct positif effect of democratic institutions is higher for sulfur 
dioxide per capita than for carbon dioxide per capita in developed countries and in developing 
countries. These results can be explained by the fact that sulfur dioxide emissions are a local 
pollutant contrary to carbon dioxide that is a global pollutant. 
Table  (7):  Effect  of  democratic  institutions  on  environment  quality  according  to 
economic development 
Dependent variables (One step 
GMM-System) 
 
Log of carbon dioxide per 
capita 
 
Log of sulfur  dioxide per 
capita 
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  1.92)**  (3.92)***  (2.19)**  (2.79)** 
 




















  (1.68)*  (1.72)*  (0.73)  (1.01) 
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Log of Trade openness  0.227  -0.321  0.055  -0.159 
  (1.61)  (1.56)  (1.02)  (2.12)** 
 









  (2.57)**  (2.47)**  (1.87)*  (1.82)* 
 





































Number of codepays  90  27  76  25 
AR(1)  0.001  0.09  0.0 3  0.22 
AR(2)  0,13  0.32  0.47  0.26 
Hansen Test  0,44  0.70  0.60  0.31 
Number of instruments  17  17  18  17 
NB: * significatif at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The study period is 1960-2008. Temporal dummies are included. 
 
 
4.4.3. The form of democratic system 
We find that democratic institutions have a direct positive effect on air quality. In democratic 
institutions there are different forms of gouvernment: presidential and parliamentary.  Does 
the form of democratic gouvernment affect environment quality?  Indeed recent research on 
the provision of public goods such as environment argues that the form of government in 
democratic  political  systems  is  an  important  factor.    Persson  et  al.  (2000)  think  that 
presidential  system  would  underproduce  public  goods  because  legislative  coalitions  are 
unstable  and  leaders  promote  the  allocation  of  spending  to  powerfull  minorities. 
Parliamentary system would increase spending on public goods and satisfy the majority of 
voters.  However, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) develop selectorate theory and show that 
presidential  system  would  produce  more  public  goods  (prosperity,  peace,  transparency, 
political rights, and civil liberties) than parliamentary system. Results are mixed for public 
goods such as education, health care, social security, and foreign policy.  Bernauer & Koubi 
(2008)  also  find  that  presidential  system  reduce  sulfur  dioxide  emissions  more  than 
parliamentarysystem. We include in our analysis an index of the type of democratic system. It 
is  a  trichotomous  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  0  for  presidential  democracies;  1  for 
assembly-elected president democracies and 2 for parliamentary democracies. 
Table (8) : Effect on democratic institutions on environment quality  
Dependent variables  Log of carbon dioxide per capita 
 
Log ofsulfur dioxide per capita 




           (1)  (2)               (3)           (4) 
Log of initial carbon 
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  (0.73)  (0.64)  (1.41)  (1.74)* 
 
























  (2.81)***  (3.15)***  (3.75)***  (3.99)*** 
 









  (2.32)**  (2.20)**  (0.15)  (0.03) 
 










Form of democratic 
government 
   
0.027 
(0.71) 























Number of codepays  117  115  101  100 
AR(1)  0.01  0.01  0.05  0.01 
AR(2)  0.10  0.12  0.23  0.59 
Hansen Test  0.27  0.22  0.40  0.25 
Number of 
instruments 
18  23  27  25 
NB: * significatif at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The study period is 1960-2008. Temporal dummies are included. 
 
 
Results (columns 2 & 4, table8) indicate that the form of democratic system have no effect on 
environment quality (carbon dioxid per capita and sulfur dioxide per capita). In other words 
the nature of democratic institutions has no effect on the environment quality. 
4.4.3. Sensitivity analysis 
4.4.3.1. The environmental kuznets curve 
Most previous papers in the environmental Kuznets curve (ekc) assume that environmental 
quality is a polynomial function of income per capita. In our paper, we have chosen a linear 
relation between income per capita and environmental quality.  However, as choice of the 
functional form, some authors estimate environmental degradation as a quadratic function of 
income per capita. We test the existence of environmental Kuznets curve by including the  
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squared income per capita. Results (column 1&3 of table 8) conclude that the hypothese
3 of 
environmental Kuznets curve isn‟t verified.         
4.4.3.2. Econometric method 
For estimations, we used one-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM-system). We re-
estimate our equations using two step GMM-system because two step GMM-system estimator 
is more efficient than one-step GMM-system estimator even if their standards errors can be 
severly downward biaised in small sample. This potential biais is solved by the method of 
correction (Windmeijer (2005)) of covariance matrice in finite sample. Results are in tables 9a 
&9b. We note that results are similar with those obtained by one-step GMM estimator and are 
robust.  
Table 9 a: Effect of Democratic institutions on environment quality 
Log of carbon dioxide per capita 
(Two step GMM-System) 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         










   








   
Log of income per capita  0.019  0.005  -0.010  -0.017 
  (1.18)  (0.62)  (0.52)  (1.72)* 
 









  (1.22)  (1.60)  (1.10)  (1.00) 
 









  (1.01)  (0.02)  (2.71)***  (1.16) 
 
Log of  investment 
   
0.417 
   
0.446 
    (3.13)***    (2.73)*** 
 
Income inequality  















  (0.85)  (1.88)*  (1.76)*  (0.21) 
Observations  887  823  608  577 
































Number of instruments  14  23  19  17 
                                                            
3 Others authors (Grossman and Krueger (1994), Sha…k (1994), Grossman (1995), Torras &Boyce (1998)) have 
found that for some environmental variables the environment income relationship may be better described by a 
cubic function of income per capita. In others words environmental degradation first increases, then decreases 
and finally rises again. We also test the cubic function of income per capita but results are similar to quadratic 
form of income per capita. Results are available upon request.    
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NB: * significatif at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The study period is 1960-2008. Dummy variables are included. 
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Table 9 b: Effect of Democratic institutions on environment quality 
Log of sulfurdioxide per 
capita(Two step GMM-System) 
          (1)              (2)               (3)  (4) 
         











Log of Democratic Institutions    -0.022 
(2.19)** 
-0.110 
    (1.89)* 
-0.063 
(2.00)** 
  -0.289 
(1.87)* 
   









 Population growth  0.044  0.022  -0.015  -0.042 
  (0.83)  (0.79)  (0.61)  (1.12) 
 









  (1.39)  (2.05)**  (1.28)  (1.48) 
 
Log of  investment 
   
0.191 
   
0.299 
    (3.13)***    (3.19)*** 
 
Income inequality  















  (1.49)  (0.73)  (3.67)***  (0.65) 
Observations  813  751  577  548 
Number of countries   115  115  104  101 
AR (1)  0,04  0,01  0.03  0,04 
AR(2)  0,60  0,23  0.21  0,24 
Hansen Test 
 
       0,13            0,68            0.18         0,30 
Number of instruments          12             22            11           17 
NB: * significatif at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The study period is 1960-2008. Dummy variables are included. 
 
Democratic institutions have opposite effect on environment quality: a positive direct effect 
on  environment  quality  and  negative  indirect  effects  through  investments  and  income 
inequality. In other words, on one hand democratic institutions improve environment quality 
and other part, they hurt it through income inequality and investments. 
4.4.3.4. Alternative empirical strategy: the residuals generated regressors 
We  use  another  empirical  strategy  to  analyse  the  effect  and  transmission  channels  of 
democratic  institutions  on  environment  quality.  We  apply  the  approach  of  the  residuals 
generated regressors (Gomanee et al.(2005) to test if income inequality and investments are 
robust  transmission  channels  of  democratic  institutions  on  environmental  quality.  Our 
empirical procedure also follows three steps.  
In  first  step,  we  estimate  a  basic  specification  of  environmental  quality  on  democratic 
institutions,  transmission  channels  (investments  (      ),  Income  inequality  (       ))  and 
control variables.  
                                        
                                           (4.a)  
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     : Income per capita, carbon dioxide per capita at the beginning of period, population 
growth, trade openness and      
  :  investments (      ), Income inequality (       ).  
 Secondly,  we  empirically  test  the  effect  of  democratic  institutions  on  each  transmission 
channel  and  run  a  bivariate  regression  between  the  transmission  variables  (investments 
(      ), Income inequality (       )) and democratic institutions. 
TC                                                               (4.b) 
Where the coefficient    gives a measure of the strength of the relation between the channel 
transmission  and  democratic  institutions  and  K,  representating  the  part  of  transmission 
channel (investments or income inequality) that is not attributed to democratic institutions.  
In  equation  (4.a),  we  have  both  democratic  institutions  and  transmission  channels.  If 
democratic institutions affect the transmission variables and if democratic institutions and the 
transmissions  variables  are  determinants  of  environmental  quality,  thus  the  coefficient  of 
democratic institutions, , is an estimate of a direct effect on environmental quality while the  
coefficient  of  the  transmission  channel  variable,   ,    gives  an  estimate  of  the  effect  on 
transmission channel on environmental quality –including the effect of democratic institutions 
on environmental quality via each transmission channel. To be able to check if democratic 
institutions have direct and indirect effects on environmental quality, we need to purge for 
transmission channel induced by democratic institutions.  
From  equation  (3.b),  we  construct  the  residual  estimates  (      
  res)  of  each  trasmission 
channel  (investments  (Invres)  and  income  inequality  (Ineqres)).  These  are  the  part  of 
transmission channel (investments or income inequality) that is not attributed to democratic 
institutions. Thirdly, we substitute       
  res (Invres, Ineqres) for       
   (Invesments, Income 
inequality) respectively in the basic equation (4a). We have:  
                                                    
                               (4.c) 
This transformation will affect only the coefficient on the democratic institutions variables.   
In  cases  where  the  „„transmission‟‟  variable  has  a  positive  effect  on  explained  variable 
(         ) and democratic institutions has a negative effect on the „„transmission‟‟ variable, 
this method will provide for  a lower coefficient on democratic institutions. If the variable has 
a  negative  on             and  democratic  institutions  are  a  positive  determinant  of  the 
transmission variable, the coefficient on democratic institutions will increase.  If democratic 
institutions is not a determinant of „„transmission variable‟‟ there is no effect and this method 
is not used.  
Columns (2, 4 and 6) of table10 (a&b) present the estimation results of equation (4.c) with the 
generated regressor (Invres and Ineqres).  Results indicate that Invres (the part of investments 
that is not attributed  to democratic institutions) and Ineqres (the part of income inequality that 
is not attributed  to democratic institutions)  are  determinants of environment quality.  A 
comparaison  of  columns  (1)  and  (2)  of  tables  10a&b  indicate  that  the  coefficient  on 
democratic  institutions  reduce  (from  -0.123  to  -0.119)  when  we  substitute  Invres  for 
Investment.  This  reduction  allows  us  to  conclude  that  the  coefficient  on  democratic 
institutions (column (2)) capt its direct effect on environment quality and the indirect effect 
through investments. In other words, investments are a transmission channel of democratic 
institutions. Conclusions are similar for income inequality.  
Table  (10a):  Effect  on  democratic  institutions  on  environment  quality  with  residual 
generated regressors  
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Dependent variable  Log of carbon dioxide per capita 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Log of initial carbon 






















Log of Democratic 












































  (1.36)  (0.46)  (0.79)  (0.07)  (0.67)  (0.06) 
 


































   
0.858 
       
0.431 
    (2.65)**
* 
      (4.73)*
** 










      -0.023 
(2.19)** 
  -0.018 
(3.25)*
**           
Constant  -1.237  0.294  0.840  0.198  -0.25  0.751 
















AR(1)  0.01  0.00  0.001  0.004  0.01  0.006 
AR(2)  0.92  0.41  0.13  0.16  0.10  0.25 
Hansen test   0.44  0.68  0.11  0.13  0.29  0.30 
Instruments  15  17  19  12  17  20 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
             
 
 
Table  (10b):  Effect  on  democratic  institutions  on  environment  quality  with  residual 
generated regressors 
               
Dependent variable  Log of sulfur dioxide per capita 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
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Log of initial sulfur 


























Log of Democratic 



























































































Investment residue    0.489 
(3.29)*
** 
      0.473 
(3.78)**
* 









  -0.012 
(2.14)** 
  -0.008 
(1.31) 














Observations  751  751  577  577  548  548 
Number countries  115  115  104  104  101  101 
AR(1)  0.001  0.001  0,03  0.06  0,05  0.02 
AR(2)  0.15  0.14  0,21  0.50  0,24  0.21 
Hansen test  0.24  0.19  0,11  0.18  0,13  0.88 
Instruments  19  19  11  11  26  16 
Robust t statistics in parentheses* significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
5. Conclusion 
This  paper  aims  at  analysing  the  effect  of  democratic  institutions  on  environment 
quality and at identifying channel transmissions. The main contribution of this paper is that 
we identify and test some channels by which democratic institutions affect the environment 
quality. We identify and test two transmission channels : income inequality and investments. 
We use panel data from 1960 to 2008 for 122 countries and modern econometric methods that 
are one-step GMM-System, two-step GMM-System one step, fixed effect estimators and the 
residuals generated regressors. The results are as follows: Firstly, we show that democratic 
institutions  have  opposite  effects  on  environment  quality:  a  positive  direct  effect  on 
environment quality and a negative indirect effect through investments and income inequality.  
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 Indeed, democratic institutions attract investments that hurt environment quality. Similarly, 
democratic institutions hurt environment quality because they reduce income inequality. 
Secondly, we find that the direct negative effect of democratic institutions is higher for local 
pollutant (SO2) than for global pollutant (CO2). Thirdly, the nature of democratic institutions 
(presidential,  parliamentary)  is  not  conducive  to  environmental  quality.  Fourtly,  results 
suggest that the direct positive effect of democratic institutions on environment quality is 
higher in developed countries than in developing countries. Thus, the democratic process in 
the first group of countries has increased their awareness for the environment protection. 
Results are robust with alternative econometric methods such as two-step GMM-system, the 
approach of residuals generated regressors and the inclusion of variables such as income per 
capita  squared,  the  form  of  democratic  government.  The  positive  effect  of  democratic 
institutions  shows  that  they  allow  people  to  more  conscious  of  environmental  problems. 
Democratic  institutions  are  also  responsive  to  the  demand  of  people  by  reducing  income 
inequality and increasing investments that favour economic growth. The negative effect on 
environment  quality  through  income  inequality  and  investments  put  highlights  some 
importants  factors  explaining  free  riding  behaviour  of  some  democratic  countries.  Our 
empirical  analysis  also  indicates  that  democracy  don‟t  “works”  through  the  form  of 
democratic  system:  controlling  for  the  form  of  democratic  government,  democratic 
institutions always have a direct positive impact on environment quality. Our results suggest 
policy  implications.  They  suggest  that  an  improvement  of  democratization  process  in 
countries (specially developing countries) allowing a high awareness of people. Countries 
should also find ways to reduce the indirect negative impact of democratic institutions on 
environment  quality  (for  example  the  implementation  of  ecologically  appropriate 
investments).  
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List of countries included in the sample 
Albania,Algeria,  Argentina,  Armenia,  Australia,  Austria,  Azerbaijan,  Belgium,  Burundi, 
Benin, Bangladesh, Burkina-Faso, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bahrain, Bolivia, Brazil, Botswana, 
Canada,  Central  Africa,  Chile,  China,  Cote  d‟Ivoire,  Cameroun,  Congo,  Colombia,  Costa 
Rica,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Denmark,    Ecuador,  Egypt,  Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Spain, France, Finland, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, 
Holland, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, 
Korea,  Kuwait,  Liberia,  Libya,  Luxembourg,  Lesotho,  Lithuania,  Macedonia, 
Mexico,Madagascar,  Mali,  Mauritania,  Malawi,  Malaysia,Morocco,  Moldovia,  Mongolia, 
Mozambique,  Myanmar,    Nigeria,  Netherland,  New  Zealand,  Niger,  Nicaragua,  Nepal, 
Norway,  Pakistan,Panama,  Peru,  Philippines,  New  Guinea,  Guinea,  Poland,  Portugal, 
Paraguay, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sri 
Lanka,  Sierra  Leone,  El  Salvador,  Sudan,  Syria,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  Tanzania,  Togo, 
Thailand,  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Tunisia,  Turkey,  Uganda,  Ukraine,  the  USA, 
Uruguay,Venezuela, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Table 1a : Correlation matrix for explicatives variables and Carbon dioxide per capita 




Income Inequality  Investment  Income
/capita 
Population  Trade 
C02/ capita  1.0000             
Democratic 
Institutions 
0.2787  1.0000           
Income 
Inequality 
-0.2577         -0.3898  1.0000         
Investment   0.1153  0.0492       -0.2643         1.0000       
Income/ 
capita 
-0.0050            -0.0235  -0.0256  0.2497  1.0000     
Population  -0.1364  -0.5537  0.4609  -0.1123  -0.0255  1.0000   
Trade   0.1468  0.0406        -0.0338          0.2648       -0.0742     -0.0922     1.0000 
Source : Author 
Table 1b : Correlation matrix for explicatives variables and sulfur dioxide per capita 




Income Inequality  Investment  Income
/capita 
Population  Trade 
S02/ capita  1.0000             
Democratic 
Institutions 
0.0832  1.0000           
Income 
Inequality 
-0.1521         -0.3834  1.0000         




-0.0211            -0.0324  -0.0256  0.2593  1.0000     
Population  -0.0121  -0.5690  0.4855  -0.1230  -0.0344  1.0000   
Trade   0.1034  0.0282        -0.0295          0.2738       -0.0725     -0.0340     1.0000 
Source : Author 
Table2: Papers studying the effect of democracy on environment quality 




Methane per capita 
 
+  118 countries for 
1989 










CO2  per capita   +  98 countries i for 
1990 
 
 soil erosion by water 
 
+  97 countries for the 
1980s, 
% of annual deforestation 
 
+  77 countries from 
1981 to 1990   
% of protected  
land area   




No effect   97 countries in 1990  
 the level of soil erosion 
by chemicals 
 








Barrett & Graddy 
(2000) 
 
 sulfur dioxide per capita 
 
-  a pooled 
sample of countries 
for about 33 years 
     
water pollution  No effect   45 countries for 












-   Samples of 19–42 




(dissolved oxygen, fecal 
coliform, 
access to safe water, and 
access to sanitation)  
-  58 countries from 




 water pollution and 
particulate emissions 
 







-   
Gleditsch and   CO2 per capita  -  108 countries in 1990  
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Li & Reveuny 
(2006) 
 
 land degradation 
 





-  143 countries from 
1961 to 1997 
     
 NOx emissions  -  118countries in 1990, 




Koubi (2009)  
 
sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
concentrations  
-  42 countries from 
1971 to 1996 
 
Table3: Descriptive statistics 
  Average  Standard dev  Min  Max 
 Carbon dioxide per capita   4,04  6,69  0  76,16 
Democratic Institutions  0 ,32  7,33  -10  10 
Investment rate  21,37    2,53  86,79 
Income Inequality  41,58  6,67  21.82  62,32 
Trade openness  67,83    2,35  466,31 
Population growth rate  1,87  1,54  -20,36  11,80 
Income per capita  5147,74  7842,89  83,50  53653.35 
Source: WDI (2008), Polity IV, University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) database 
(2008) and author 
 
Table4a : Effect of democratic institutions on environment quality 
Log of carbon dioxide emissions per 
capita (One step GMM-System) 
    (1)    (2)      (3)       (4) 
 
























Log of income per capita  0.01  0.005  -0.005  -0.019  
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  (0.90)  (1.63)  (1.72)*  (0.30) 
Observations  887  823 
 
608  577 
































Number of instruments   12  15  19  17 










Table4b: Effect of democratic institutions on environment quality 
Log of sulfure dioxide emissions per 
capita (One step GMM-System) 
    (1)    (2)      (3)       (4) 
Log of initial sulfur dioxide per 
capita 
0.865  0.991  0.852  0.879 
  (6.86)***  (7.06)***  (32.00)***  (11.33)*** 
 









  (3.20)***  (2.59)**  (2.00)**  (2.07)**  
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  (1.10)  (0.49)  (0.26)  (1.31) 
 









  (1.21)  (0.31)  (0.61)  (1.40) 
 









  (6.86)***  (0.74)  (1.28)  (0.71) 
 
Log of  investment 
   
0.183 
   
0.187 
    (2.97)***    (1.87)* 
 
Income Inequality  


























Number of countries   115  115  104  101 
AR (1)  0,02  0,01  0,03  0,05 
AR(2)  0 ,24  0,15  0,21  0,24 
Hansen Test  0,12  0,24  0,11  0,13 
Number of instruments   20  19  11  26 






Table 5: Democratic Institutions and channel transmissions  
       Log of   
investment   
       Income Inequality 
     (1) FE     (2)  FE  (3) 
GMM System  
 
Log of Democratic Institutions   
   
0.037 





    (1.90)*    (1.26)*  (-2,31)** 
 
Log of income per capita 
   
0.075 




    (1.81)*    (3.51)***  (2.19)** 
 
 Population growth 
   
0.059 




    (3.24)***    (0.23)  (4.18)*** 
 
Log of Trade openness 
   
0.290 




    (7.09)***    (0.85)  (1.73)* 
 
Constant 
   
1.014 






  (2.50)**    (10.22)***  (2.12)** 
 
R-squared 
   
0.15 





   
662 





Number of countries 
   
122 






















NB: * significatif at10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The study period is 1960-2008. Dummy variables  
are included. 
Table 6: Difference of democratic institutions according to economic development   
Democratic Institutions  Mean  mini  max  S D 
Whole sample 
 
0.32  -10  10  7.33 











    Source: Polity IV and author 
 
Table  (7):  Effect  of  democratic  institutions  on  environment  quality  according  to 
economic development 
Dependent variables (One step 
GMM-System) 
Log of carbon dioxide per 
capita 
Log of sulfur  dioxide per 
capita  
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       (3) 
 
  Developed 
Countries  
      (4) 






   
 
Log of initial sulfurdioxide per 
capita 
 





















  1.92)**  (3.92)***  (2.19)**  (2.79)** 
 




















  (1.68)*  (1.72)*  (0.73)  (1.01) 
 









  (1.61)  (1.56)  (1.02)  (2.12)** 
 









  (2.57)**  (2.47)**  (1.87)*  (1.82)* 
 





































Number of codepays  90  27  76  25 
AR(1)  0.001  0.09  0.0 3  0.22 
AR(2)  0,13  0.32  0.47  0.26 
Hansen Test  0,44  0.70  0.60  0.31 
Number of instruments  17  17  18  17 
NB: * significatif at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The study period is 1960-2008. Temporal dummies are included. 
 
 
Table (8) : Effect on democratic institutions on environment quality  
Dependent variables  Log of carbon dioxide per capita 
 
Log ofsulfur dioxide per capita 
    




Log of initial carbon 





   
 
Log of initial sulfur 
dioxide per capita 











































  (0.73)  (0.64)  (1.41)  (1.74)* 
 
























  (2.81)***  (3.15)***  (3.75)***  (3.99)*** 
 









  (2.32)**  (2.20)**  (0.15)  (0.03) 
 










Form of democratic 
government 
   
0.027 
(0.71) 























Number of codepays  117  115  101  100 
AR(1)  0.01  0.01  0.05  0.01 
AR(2)  0.10  0.12  0.23  0.59 
Hansen Test  0.27  0.22  0.40  0.25 
Number of 
instruments 
18  23  27  25 
NB: * significatif at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The study period is 1960-2008. Temporal dummies are included. 
 
 
Table 9 a: Effect of Democratic institutions on environment quality 
Log of carbon dioxide per capita 
(Two step GMM-System) 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
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Log of income per capita  0.019  0.005  -0.010  -0.017 
  (1.18)  (0.62)  (0.52)  (1.72)* 
 









  (1.22)  (1.60)  (1.10)  (1.00) 
 









  (1.01)  (0.02)  (2.71)***  (1.16) 
 
Log of  investment 
   
0.417 
   
0.446 
    (3.13)***    (2.73)*** 
 
Income inequality  















  (0.85)  (1.88)*  (1.76)*  (0.21) 
Observations  887  823  608  577 
































Number of instruments  14  23  19  17 
NB: * significatif at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The study period is 1960-2008. Dummy variables are included. 
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Table 9 b: Effect of Democratic institutions on environment quality 
Log of sulfurdioxide per 
capita(Two step GMM-System) 
          (1)              (2)               (3)  (4) 
         











Log of Democratic Institutions    -0.022 
(2.19)** 
-0.110 
    (1.89)* 
-0.063 
(2.00)** 
  -0.289 
(1.87)* 
   









 Population growth  0.044  0.022  -0.015  -0.042 
  (0.83)  (0.79)  (0.61)  (1.12) 
 









  (1.39)  (2.05)**  (1.28)  (1.48) 
 
Log of  investment 
   
0.191 
   
0.299 
    (3.13)***    (3.19)*** 
 
Income inequality  















  (1.49)  (0.73)  (3.67)***  (0.65) 
Observations  813  751  577  548 
Number of countries   115  115  104  101 
AR (1)  0,04  0,01  0.03  0,04 
AR(2)  0,60  0,23  0.21  0,24 
Hansen Test 
 
       0,13            0,68            0.18         0,30 
Number of instruments          12             22            11           17 
NB: * significatif at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The study period is 1960-2008. Dummy variables are included. 
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Table  (10a):  Effect  on  democratic  institutions  on  environment  quality  with  residual 
generated regressors 
Dependent variable  Log of carbon dioxide per capita 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Log of initial carbon 






















Log of Democratic 












































  (1.36)  (0.46)  (0.79)  (0.07)  (0.67)  (0.06) 
 


































   
0.858 
       
0.431 
    (2.65)**
* 
      (4.73)*
** 










      -0.023 
(2.19)** 
  -0.018 
(3.25)*
**           
Constant  -1.237  0.294  0.840  0.198  -0.25  0.751 
















AR(1)  0.01  0.00  0.001  0.004  0.01  0.006 
AR(2)  0.92  0.41  0.13  0.16  0.10  0.25 
Hansen test   0.44  0.68  0.11  0.13  0.29  0.30 
Instruments  15  17  19  12  17  20 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 




Table  (10b):  Effect  on  democratic  institutions  on  environment  quality  with  residual 
generated regressors 
               
Dependent variable  Log of sulfur dioxide per capita 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
Log of initial sulfur 


























Log of Democratic 



























































































Investment residue    0.489 
(3.29)*
** 
      0.473 
(3.78)**
* 









  -0.012 
(2.14)** 
  -0.008 
(1.31) 














Observations  751  751  577  577  548  548 
Number countries  115  115  104  104  101  101 
AR(1)  0.001  0.001  0,03  0.06  0,05  0.02 
AR(2)  0.15  0.14  0,21  0.50  0,24  0.21 
Hansen test  0.24  0.19  0,11  0.18  0,13  0.88 
Instruments  19  19  11  11  26  16 
Robust t statistics in parentheses* significant at 10%; ** significant 





Table 11: Définition and  data sources  
Variables  Définitions  Source de données 
Emissions  of  carbon 
dioxide per capita 







Emissions  per  capita 
initial   
Carbon dioxide per capita at the beginning 
of each period  
Investment rate   Investment/PIB 
Trade openess rate  (Exportations+Importations)  /  Gross 
Domestic Product 




Combined  score  of  democracy 
and￿ autocracy on a scale going from -10 
to  10.    (-  10)  large  represents  a  big 




Income Inequality  EHII  (Estimated  Household  Income 
Inequality)  variable  is  an  index  ranging 
from  0  (no  inequality)  to  1  (perfect 
inequality)  






     
 